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1 Introduction
Relative deprivation has attracted increasing attention in the past decades when the mea-
surement of individual well-being gained importance not only in the academic context but
also in the public discourse and in policy-making circles. The main reason for this is the
characteristic at the basis of the concept: the observation that, since individuals do not live
in isolation, they determine their well-being also from comparisons with others. Although
this consideration appears to be absent from much of standard economic modelling, it has
been shown to be one of the main determinants of self-reported satisfaction with income
and life; for a survey see, for example, Frey and Stutzer (2002). Measuring relative depri-
vation is important not only per se but also because of its links to major social phenomena
such as crime (Stack, 1984), political violence (Gurr, 1968), health status (Wagstaff and
van Doorslaer, 2000; Jones and Wildman, 2008), mortality (Salti, 2010) and migration
decisions (Stark and Taylor, 1989).
The pioneering contribution in the economics literature on the measurement of relative
deprivation is Yitzhaki (1979). Yitzhaki bases his approach on Runciman’s (1966, p.10)
definition of relative deprivation: “We can roughly say that [a person] is relatively deprived
of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may
include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X, (iii) he sees it as feasible
that he should have X.” Yitzhaki (1979) proposes to consider income as the object of
relative deprivation. Individual comparisons, which are at the basis of all indices of
relative deprivation proposed since then, are absent in Yitzhaki’s (1979) contribution, as
he himself acknowledges in Yitzhaki (1980).
The income shortfall approach to individual deprivation measurement is due to Hey
and Lambert (1980). Motivated by Runciman’s remark (1966, p.10) that “[t]he magnitude
of a relative deprivation is the extent of the difference between the desired situation and
that of the person desiring it,” Hey and Lambert (1980) obtain the index proposed by
Yitzhaki (1979) by providing an alternative individual-based interpretation of it: each
individual compares herself to better-off individuals and the sentiment of deprivation felt
with respect to each of them is quantifiable by how short of income she is with respect
to the richer individual. The individual index of relative deprivation is the sum of these
sentiments divided by the population size. This interpretation has become one of this
measure’s distinguishing features.
A variety of aggregate indices of relative deprivation based on income shortfalls have
been proposed following these early contributions. Chakravarty and Chakraborty (1984)
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generalize the aggregate index of relative deprivation proposed by Yitzhaki (1979). Berrebi
and Silber (1985) and Imedio-Olmedo, Parrado-Gallardo and Ba´rcena-Mart´ın (2012) show
that many of the commonly used inequality indices can be written as aggregate indices
of relative deprivation. The interpretation of a generalization of the Gini index (namely,
the single-parameter Ginis; see Donaldson and Weymark, 1980, and Weymark, 1981)
as indices of aggregate relative deprivation is due to Duclos (2000) and Verme (2011).
Chakravarty, Chattopadhyay and Majumder (1995), Chakravarty (1997) and Chakravarty
and Moyes (2003) propose deprivation quasi-orderings. Kakwani (1984) introduces a
useful graphical device, the relative deprivation curve, to represent income shortfalls as
a proportion of mean income, and proves that the area under this curve is the Gini
coefficient. While the majority of the contributions on relative deprivation propose various
aggregate indices, mainly adapting results from inequality measurement, there also are
a relatively small number of papers that explicitly deal with individual deprivation. For
instance, Ebert and Moyes (2000) and Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) characterize the
individual deprivation index that is linear in income shortfalls (Yitzhaki, 1979; Hey and
Lambert, 1980).
Some authors who deal with individual deprivation focus on the task of capturing the
intensity of deprivation felt by an individual in the comparison to those who are better off
by enriching measures that are based on income shortfalls. Among other features, their
contributions can be viewed as addressing the feasibility aspect of deprivation underlined
by Runciman (1966). According to Runciman (1966, p.10), “[t]he qualification of ‘feasi-
bility’ is obviously imprecise, but it is necessary in order to exclude fantasy wishes. A
man may say with perfect truth that he wants to be as rich as the Aga Khan [...] but to
include these under the heading of relative deprivation would rob the term of its value.”
A similar position on feasibility can be found in Gurr (1968, p.1104) who states that
“[r]elative deprivation is defined as actors’ perceptions of discrepancy between their value
expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifi-
ably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that
they think they are able to get and keep).” The question of how to deal with the feasibil-
ity aspect is a subtle issue. One possible response is to simply reduce Yitzhaki’s (1979)
proposed comparison group of all richer individuals by eliminating individuals who are
‘much richer’ (such as the Aga Khan in the above Runciman quote) altogether. However,
such a rather drastic move would seem to have problems of its own. First of all, it is by no
means obvious how the term ‘much richer’ can be defined properly and it seems doubtful
that an unambiguous and widely acceptable definition of that notion can be formulated.
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Moreover, even if we may not want to accord the same standing to individuals who are
‘considerably’ richer, it seems unwarranted to exclude them entirely from consideration.
It seems desirable to us that there be at least some increase in individual deprivation
if, ceteris paribus, the income of a richer person increases; we consider this an essential
monotonicity requirement, as do the other authors dealing with this issue. A more ade-
quate response that we (along with all other relevant contributions that we are aware of)
endorse is to find a way of assigning more significance to a richer individual depending
on how close her income is to that of the person under consideration. However, as will
become clear in the following section, we depart significantly from the earlier literature
by retaining a structure that is based on income shortfalls.
Contributions that are close to our own as far as the feasibility issue is concerned
include those of Paul (1991), Chakravarty and Chattopadhyay (1994), Podder (1996)
and Esposito (2010). Among these, Esposito (2010) is the only one that provides a
characterization of the individual deprivation index that is being proposed. All of these
authors abandon the income shortfall approach in the sense that they either operate within
a utility shortfall framework as that mentioned in Hey and Lambert (1980) or focus on
income ratios rather than income differences. One of the objectives of the present paper
is to show that these modifications are not necessary in order to address the feasibility
problem: to ensure that higher incomes have a higher impact on individual deprivation the
closer they are to the income of the individual in question, the income shortfall approach
can be retained. We provide a characterization of a class of individual indices with this
property in addition to axiomatizing a more general class.
Section 2 contains a review of the individual indices of relative deprivation proposed in
the literature as well as our generalization of the linear income shortfall index. Section 3
presents a characterization of this generalized class, and the subclass that we specifically
endorse in this paper is axiomatized in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Individual deprivation indices
We consider a fixed population of n + 1 individuals and analyze the deprivation of a
fixed individual (for convenience, individual n + 1) where n can be any positive integer
greater than one. Our results remain true if the case in which n equals one is included.
However, this case is somewhat degenerate and axioms such as anonymity and additive
decomposability are redundant if n = 1. The set of individuals other than the person
under consideration is N = {1, . . . , n}.
3
An income distribution is an (n + 1)-dimensional vector (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ where y =
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn+ is the income vector of the members of society other than individual
n+1 and x ∈ R+ is the income of this person n+1. For n ∈ N, 1n is the vector consisting
of n ones. For y,y′ ∈ Rn+ and a subset M of N , the vector z = (y|M ,y′|N\M) is defined
as follows. For all i ∈ N ,
zi =
{
yi if i ∈M,
y′i if i ∈ N \M.
An individual measure of deprivation is a function D:Rn+1+ → R+. D(y;x) is inter-
preted as the deprivation suffered by the person under consideration with income x when
the remaining members of the society have the incomes described by y in the distribution
(y;x). We let B(y;x) = {j ∈ N | yj > x} denote the set of those with a higher income
than person n+ 1.
The linear income shortfall deprivation measure DL proposed by Hey and Lambert
(1980) and inspired by Yitzhaki (1979) is defined as follows. For all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
DL(y;x) =
{




(yj − x) if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
This index can be generalized in an intuitive manner. For any increasing function
F :R++ → R++, the corresponding individual deprivation index DF is defined by letting,
for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
DF (y;x) =
{
0 if B(y;x) = ∅,∑
j∈B(y;x) F (yj − x) if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
These indices generalize DL, which is the special case obtained by choosing F (t) = t/n
for all t ∈ R++ in the definition of DF . Consequently, we refer to the members of this
class as generalized income shortfall deprivation measures.
Paul (1991) proposes an individual index that is sensitive to transfers among richer
individuals. It is obtained by considering specific increasing transformations of the ratios
x/yj as opposed to the income shortfalls yj − x. His class uses a parameter β ∈ (1,∞)
that reflects the degree of sensitivity to income transfers among the better-off. For any
β ∈ (1,∞), the index Dβ is defined by letting, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
Dβ(y;x) =










|B(y;x)| if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
The indices of Chakravarty and Chattopadhyay (1994) and of Podder (1996) are special
cases of the class DU , where U :R+ → R+ is an increasing and strictly concave utility
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function. This class of measures was suggested by Hey and Lambert (1980) and the
individual index corresponding to any such U is defined by letting, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
DU(y;x) =
{
0 if B(y;x) = ∅,∑
j∈B(y;x) [U(yj)− U(x)] if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
Chakravarty and Chattopadhyay (1994) employ a power function U with a positive power,
whereas Podder (1996) suggests to use a logarithmic utility function U .
Esposito (2010), following these earlier contributions, proposes and characterizes a
class based on relative utility gaps, employing a power function with a positive power
α, defined by U(t) = tα for all t ∈ R+. The class of individual deprivation measures of
Esposito (2010) is Dα with a parameter α ∈ R++ defined by letting, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
Dα(y;x) =






if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
What is common to the classes Dβ, DU and Dα is that they cannot be expressed
as functions of the income shortfalls yj − x. Thus, these measures accommodate the
feasibility aspect of individual deprivation by deviating from the linearity exhibited in
DL and from the notion that individual deprivation is based on income shortfalls. In
contrast, the measures we advocate—the subclass of DF corresponding to increasing and
strictly concave functions F—retain the traditional reliance on income shortfalls, thereby
illustrating that the desire to incorporate feasibility issues does not require the income
shortfall approach to be abandoned altogether.
3 Generalized income shortfall deprivation measures
The linear index of individual deprivation DL is characterized by Ebert and Moyes (2000)
and by Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006). There are several significant differences that
distinguish our axiomatization of the class DF from these earlier approaches. We will
discuss these differences in more detail after introducing our list of axioms.
Normalization requires individual deprivation to be equal to zero whenever there is no
one in society with a higher income than the individual under consideration.
Normalization. For all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ , if B(y;x) = ∅, then
D(y;x) = 0.
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The next axiom is a focus axiom, requiring that the income levels of those who are
at or below person (n + 1)’s income level are irrelevant. This property parallels Sen’s
(1976) focus axiom for poverty measures and it formalizes the idea that the comparison
group in measuring deprivation consists of all members of society who are richer than the
individual under consideration.
Focus. For all y,y′ ∈ Rn+ and for all x ∈ R+, if B(y;x) = B(y′;x) and yj = y′j for all
j ∈ B(y;x), then
D(y;x) = D(y′;x).
Anonymity demands that the index treat all individuals other than the person whose
deprivation is being measured equally, paying no attention to their identities.
Anonymity. For all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ and for all permutations pi:N → N ,
D
(
(ypi(1), . . . , ypi(n));x
)
= D(y;x).
We require D to be increasing in the incomes of those with higher incomes than the
individual under consideration. The axiom only applies in situations such that the set
B(y;x) is non-empty; if this set is empty, the property is vacuously satisfied.






Translation invariance requires the index to be absolute, that is, invariant with respect
to equal absolute changes in all incomes.
Translation invariance. For all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ and for all δ ∈ R such that (y+ δ1n;x+
δ) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
D(y + δ1n;x+ δ) = D(y;x).
Additive decomposability is a separability property. The version of Ebert and Moyes
(2000) which they call additive decomposition postulates that, for any income distribution,
deprivation for that distribution and any reference group is equal to the sum of the levels
of deprivation that result if the reference group is divided into two subgroups, keeping the
income distribution unchanged (the case where one of the subgroups is empty is covered
by the axiom). Clearly, if the reference group is fixed and given by the entire society,
the axiom does not apply except in degenerate cases. However, a natural analogue is
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obtained by considering distributions where the individuals in each of two subgroups of
the comparison group have the same income as individual n + 1 (and, therefore, do not
contribute to that person’s deprivation) and then apply the additivity requirement using
these distributions. The following axiom is a weakening of the version employed by Bossert
and D’Ambrosio (2006).
Additive decomposability. For all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ such that B(y;x) 6= ∅ and for all










A thorough comparison between our set of axioms and those employed by Ebert and
Moyes (2000) and by Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) is in order.
As is the case for the present contribution, Ebert and Moyes (2000) and Bossert and
D’Ambrosio (2006) employ the focus axiom and translation invariance.
Moreover, Ebert and Moyes (2000) and Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) use linear
homogeneity which is crucial, along with their remaining axioms, to obtain the linear
structure of F that leads to the index DL. Clearly, this axiom is not required in the
present approach.
The normalization properties in these earlier contributions are considerably stronger
than ours because they impose specific positive values of individual deprivation for spe-
cific distributions. This move is required to obtain the result that the sum of income
shortfalls from those with higher incomes is divided by the total number of individuals
in the population, as is the case for DL. In contrast, our normalization condition merely
states that individual deprivation is zero if no one has a higher income than the person
under consideration. This represents a quite pronounced departure from these earlier
approaches.
Ebert and Moyes (2000) employ an anonymity condition just like ours. This require-
ment is not imposed by Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) because the normalization con-
dition used in that contribution (in conjunction with the remaining axioms) is sufficient
to ensure that the resulting index is anonymous.
Both Ebert and Moyes (2000) and Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) impose an addi-
tive decomposability property. The two versions differ in that the additive-decomposition
axiom in Ebert and Moyes (2000) can only be used in their specific setting where the
reference group is permitted to vary independently from the income distribution under
consideration. Thus, this axiom cannot be formulated in the framework considered in
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Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) and in the present contribution. A more detailed dis-
cussion of this crucial issue can be found in Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006). Additive
decomposability as defined here is a weakening of the axiom that is used by Bossert and
D’Ambrosio (2006); the version employed here only applies to situations in which the set
of individuals B(y;x) is non-empty.
The independence condition of Ebert and Moyes (2000) cannot be formulated in the
setting used here and in Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) because it rests on the assumption
made by Ebert and Moyes (2000) that the composition and the size of the reference group
may vary in a way that is independent of the income distribution. Consequently, the
axiom does not appear in the present contribution and neither is it used in Bossert and
D’Ambrosio (2006).
The only property we use that does not play a role in these earlier articles is increas-
ingness. It is not required in Ebert and Moyes (2000) and in Bossert and D’Ambrosio
(2006) because degenerate measures such as that assigning an individual deprivation value
of zero to all income distributions are ruled out by their other axioms, notably their nor-
malization properties that are also responsible for features other than the assignment of a
zero value to situations with no individual deprivation. Because our normalization prop-
erty is more modest in its scope, the additional monotonicity property has to be imposed
explicitly.
A final observation that is of some interest is that the transformation of the relevant
income shortfalls in the indexDL is linear—as mentioned earlier, it is given by the function
F such that F (t) = t/n for all t ∈ R++. Clearly, this transformation F is continuous and,
thus, this continuity property cannot but be implied by the axiom systems used by Ebert
and Moyes (2000) and by Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006). In contrast, no continuity
properties are implied by the system of axioms employed in the first characterization of
the present paper—the only requirement imposed on F is increasingness. This represents
another quite fundamental departure from the earlier literature and illustrates that the
characterization theorem is not merely a minor variation on existing results.
The above axioms characterize the class DF of individual deprivation measures.
Theorem 1 An individual deprivation index D satisfies normalization, focus, anonymity,
increasingness, translation invariance and additive decomposability if and only if there
exists an increasing function F :R++ → R++ such that D = DF .
Proof. That DF satisfies the requisite axioms for any increasing function F :R++ → R++
is straightforward to verify.
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Conversely, suppose D is an individual deprivation index satisfying the axioms. Con-




with yj > x. Thus, for





= {j} 6= ∅
and everyone in N other than j has the same income as person n+ 1. Using translation







((yj − x)1n|{j}, 01n|N\{j}); 0
)
. (1)
Let, for all t ∈ R++,





The function F thus defined clearly has the domain R++. Increasingness and the definition
of F together imply that F (yj − x) > F ((yj + x)/2− x) and the term on the right side of
this inequality is non-negative because D cannot assume negative values. Thus, F maps
into R++. Using increasingness and the definition of F again, it follows that F must be
an increasing function. By anonymity, F can be chosen to be independent of j.
Now let (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ be arbitrary.
If B(y;x) = ∅, normalization implies that D(y;x) = 0.
If B(y;x) 6= ∅, the focus axiom allows us to assume, without loss of generality, that












F (yj − x)
because of (1) and (2).
The axioms used in the above characterization result are independent, as illustrated
by means of the following six examples.
Example 1 Let F :R++ → R++ be increasing and define, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
D(y;x) =
{
1 if B(y;x) = ∅,∑
j∈B(y;x) F (yj − x) if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
This index satisfies all of the axioms except for normalization.
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Example 2 Let F :R++ → R++ be increasing and define, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
D(y;x) =
{
0 if B(y;x) = ∅,∑
j∈B(y;x) F (yj − x) +
∑
j∈N\B(y;x) F (|yj − x|) if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
This index satisfies all of the axioms except for focus.
Example 3 Let, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, Fj:R++ → R++ be increasing and let Fn(t) =
2F1(t) for all t ∈ R++. Now define, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
D(y;x) =
{
0 if B(y;x) = ∅,∑
j∈B(y;x) Fj(yj − x) if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
This index satisfies all of the axioms except for anonymity.
Example 4 Define, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
D(y;x) = 0.
This index satisfies all of the axioms except for increasingness.
Example 5 Let F :R++ → R++ be increasing and define, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
D(y;x) =
{
0 if B(y;x) = ∅,∑
j∈B(y;x) F (yj) if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
This index satisfies all of the axioms except for translation invariance.
Example 6 Define, for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ ,
D(y;x) =





if B(y;x) 6= ∅.
This index satisfies all of the axioms except for additive decomposability.
4 Proximity-sensitive deprivation measures
The following axiom expresses what we think is a plausible aspect of individual depri-
vation. Loosely speaking, it requires that, ceteris paribus, an individual’s deprivation is
more affected by increases in higher incomes that occur closer to her own.
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Proximity sensitivity. For all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ , for all j ∈ B(y;x) and for all y′j, y′′j ∈ R++

















If proximity sensitivity is added to the list of axioms in Theorem 1, the subclass of
our measures that are associated with a function F that is strictly concave in addition
to being increasing is characterized. In the presence of proximity sensitivity, the axiom
increasingness is redundant and can therefore be dropped from the list.
Theorem 2 An individual deprivation index D satisfies normalization, focus, anonymity,
translation invariance, additive decomposability and proximity sensitivity if and only if
there exists an increasing and strictly concave function F :R++ → R++ such that D = DF .
Proof. Suppose F :R++ → R++ is increasing and strictly concave. For future reference,
observe first that F is strictly concave if and only if
F (v)− F (u)
v − u >
F (w)− F (v)
w − v (3)
for all u, v, w ∈ R++ such that u < v < w.
That DF satisfies normalization, focus, anonymity, translation invariance and additive
decomposability follows immediately from Theorem 1. We now prove thatDF also satisfies
















F (y′′j − x)− F (y′j − x)
y′′j − y′j
for all (y;x) ∈ Rn+1+ , for all j ∈ B(y;x) and for all y′j, y′′j ∈ R++ such that yj < y′j < y′′j .
Thus, proximity sensitivity is satisfied if and only if
F (y′j − x)− F (yj − x)
y′j − yj
>
F (y′′j − x)− F (y′j − x)
y′′j − y′j
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for all x ∈ R+ and for all yj, y′j, y′′j ∈ R++ such that x < yj < y′j < y′′j . This inequality
must be true, as can be seen by setting u = yj − x, v = y′j − x and w = y′′j − x in (3).
Now suppose that D satisfies the axioms of the theorem statement. As in the proof





yj > x. Translation invariance implies (1) and we can define the function F by (2).
Again, it is immediate that the domain of F is given by R++.
Proximity sensitivity and the definition of F together imply that we must have
F (y′j − x)− F (yj − x)
y′j − yj
>
F (y′′j − x)− F (y′j − x)
y′′j − y′j
for all x ∈ R+ and for all yj, y′j, y′′j ∈ R++ such that x < yj < y′j < y′j. Using (3) again,
this inequality implies that F is strictly concave.
By way of contradiction, suppose that F is not increasing. Then there exist u, v ∈ R++
such that u < v and F (u) ≥ F (v). Because F is strictly concave, this implies that F
is decreasing on (v,∞). Invoking the strict concavity of F again, it follows that F must
assume negative values for sufficiently large values of its argument, a contradiction to the
assumption that D maps into R+. Thus, F must be increasing.
The remainder of the proof is identical to that of Theorem 1.
The axioms used in Theorem 2 are independent. To see this, the six examples of
the previous section can be employed, provided that the requisite transformations F and
F1, . . . , Fn are chosen to be strictly concave.
An interesting observation is that the presence of proximity sensitivity rather than
increasingness in the list of axioms implies that the function F must be continuous; this
is an immediate consequence of the well-known result that (strict) concavity implies con-
tinuity for functions whose domain is an open subset of R. Note that no such implication
is obtained in Theorem 1.
Clearly, any strictly concave function F :R++ → R++ can be used to generate an
individual deprivation index that belongs to the subclass characterized in Theorem 2.
Prominent examples include functions of the form F (t) = tα/n for all t ∈ R++ where the
power α is in the interval (0, 1) to ensure that the resulting function is strictly concave.
For instance, the square root multiplied by 1/n is obtained for α = 1/2.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose and characterize a family of individual deprivation indices with
the intention of better capturing the intensity of deprivation felt by an individual in the
comparison to those who are better off. These indices are obtained by enriching measures
that are based on income shortfalls while retaining their fundamental structure. The key
feature addressed is that of feasibility of the object of deprivation.
Capturing the intensity of individual sentiments also is a key task in other disciplines
such as psychology. In that area, relative deprivation is seen as the determinant of envy,
a negative sentiment based on undeserved inferiority. In discussing this issue, Ben-Ze’ev
(2000, p.311) supports our view that income shortfalls should enter in a strictly concave
manner: in Ben-Ze’ev’s (2000) contribution, the curve expressing envy towards the good
fortune of others indeed turns out to be bell-shaped.
An interesting task for future research consists of extending the analysis by incorporat-
ing intertemporal aspects. Allowing past experiences and future expectations to matter
may enhance our understanding of the impact of including feasibility considerations when
assessing individual deprivation.
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